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PRINCIPAL ATTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.
ABANDONMENT OF VOYAGE.
Where a ship sailed from Baltimore bound for Portland, Oregon, and"
was compelled to put into Rio to refit, and after being refitted, sailed for
San Francisco, but was again compelled to return to Rio, a bottomry bond
executed at Rio, having been made payable at San Francisco: Held, no
abandonment of the -voyage to Portland, San Francisco being on the route
to the place of final destination. Winter vs. Delaware Insurance Company, 572'
ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF KENTUCKY.
See Municipal Subscriptions.
ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF NEW JERSEY.
See Bridge.
ACT OF ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
See Death by Violence.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
See Slavery.
ACT OF CONGRESS, MARCH 2, 1881.
See Contempt.
ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1850.
See Lien.
ACT OF CONGRESS, MARCH 3, 1851.
See Bill of Lading.
ACTS OF MISSISSIPPI, 1833-1840.
See Constitutional Law.
ACTION.
See Misjoinder.
1. A declaration aeged that the defendant, being possessed of a horse
which he knew to be afflicted with glanders, caused it to be sold by auction
49
INDEX.
at a horse repository; that the plaintiff, believing it to be in a healthy
state, purchased it; that by reason of the disease it was worthless to him,
and he was put to expense in having a veterinary surgeon to examine it;
and in consequence of its being put into a stable with another horse, that
horse became infected and died, and the plaintiff was put to expense in
endeavoring to cure it: Held, that this declaration disclosed no ground of
action, either at common law or under the 16 & 17 Vict. e. 62. Bill vs.
Balls, . . . . . .. 162
2. Per Martin and Bramwell, BB., (dabitante Pollock, C. B )-The mere
fact of selling a glandered horse is not an illegal act, either at common law
or under the 16 & 17 Viet. a. 62. Ibid.
3. A sealed instrument in these words: "Doe A. $1,071, for value
received, which I hereby promise to pay whenever, iN my oriNiox, my cir-
cvmstances will be such as to enable ae so to do," does not create any legal
obligation, which can be enforced by action ; nor will it support a narr
alleging a promise by the obligor to pay "whenever his circumstances
were such, &c.," with an averment of ability to pay. Nelson vs. Von
Bomhorst, - - 151
ACTOR.
See Injunction.
ADMIRALTY SALE.
See Lien.
ADMIRALTY.
See Lien. Pilotage.
1. Whilst a vessel is in the actual and legal possession of the Sheriff by
virtue of a writ of foreign attachment from a common law court of a State,
the United States Marshal cannot lawfully execute an attachment against
her issued out of the District Court of the United States in Admiralty in a
proceeding in rem. Taylor vs. Carryl, - - - 646
2. The United States Admiralty Court has no jurisdiction over a vessel
whilst she is in the hands of the Sheriff by virtue of a legal process, and
an order for the sale of such a vessel made by the Admiralty is void : and
a Marshal's sale by virtue of such an order, though the sale be made after
the Sheriff's possession had ceased, is inoperative and gives no title to the
purchaser. Ibid.
3. Where, in the Admiralty, two claims are made upon the fund in the
registry of the court, one arising from a mortgage given at a foreign port,
and entered upon the vessel's register, for outfit and supplies for the voyage,
and the other upon a bill of lading executed by the master for the voyage,
for specie received on board and never delivered: Held, that the latter has
priority over the former in the distribution of the fund. Justi Pon vs.
The Proceeds of the Brig Arbustei, 11- -
AGENT.
See Principal and Agent. Railroad.
AGREEMENT.
See Contract. Sale.
ANIMAL INFIRMARY.
See Charitable Bequest.
ASSIGNMENT.
1. Although at common law an assignment will not convey a chattel
unless it is in esse at the time of the transfer, it is otherwise in equity,
Ltudlow vs. Hurd, 4- ... 93
2. Personal property follows the law of the domicile of the owner as
to transfer; and the execution of an assignment of personalty passes the
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personalty wherever situate, ipso facto, to the assignee, provided the as-
signment be valid in the State where it is executed. Mowry, Assignee vs.
Crocker, - - 737
.3. It is sufficient, if any notice of the assignment comes to the debtor;
the assignment works an equitable transfer of the debt,; and the notice
will charge the debtor with the duty of payment to the assignee. Ibid.
4. An attachment subsequently laid, although before the actual re-
duction of the money into the assignee's possession, cannot prevail against
him. Ibid.
ATTACHMENT.
See Admiralty. Assignment.
ATTACHMENT EXECUTION.
See Injunction.
ATTORNEY.
1. An authority delegated to an attorney from three trustees, having a
power coupled with an interest, and from the survivors and survivor of
them to sell and convey lands, is not revoked by the death of one of the
trustees. Wilson vs. Stewart, - - - 372
2. Such delegation being joint and several, the attorney is invested
with the full powers of the surviving trustees, so as to pass both the bene-
ficial and the legal estates. Ibid.
3. A power which includes a future interest is effectual to pass a subse-
quently acquired title. Ibid
AUCTION.
See Action.
AUTHORITY.
See Principal and Agent.
BANK.
See Promissory Note.
BILL OF LADING.
See Admiralty. Carrier.
BOAT ACTS.
See Lien.
BONA FIDE.
See Municipal Subscription. Promissory Note.
BOND.
See Municipal Subscription.
1. Railroad or canal bonds, with coupons, deposited as collaterals for
the payment of promissory notes, may be sold, if the notes are not paid
at maturity, the presumption being that such was the intention of the
parties. The Morris Canal and Banking Company vs. Lewis, - - 428
2. Without a special agreement to that effect, ordinary bonds and mort-
gages, or promissory notes, deposited as collaterals, cannot be sold to raise
the money. Ibid.
BOTTOMRY.
See Abandonment of Voyage.
BRIDGE.
See Road. Jurisdiction.
Construction of Acts of the Legislature of New Jersey with regard to the
proprietors of the bridges over the rivers Passaic and Hackensack, and the
agreements made thereunder with respect to these rivers. Milnor vs.
New Jersey R. R. Co., - - - 6
772 INDEX.
BROKER.
See Principal and Agent.
BUILDING.
See Real Estate.
CARELESSNESS.
See Railroad.
CARRIER.
See Common Carrier of Passengers.
1. Though a carrier, in the absence of evidence of fraud or mistake, is con-
cluded by the receipt in his bill of lading as to the quantity or amount of
the goods shipped; yet, in an action for the freight, where the consignee
has received the goods at the wharf, without qualification or reservation of
the right to inspect, weigh, or measure them, and the carrier proves due
care of them during the transit, and an actual delivery of all in his pos-
session on his arrival, the burthen of proof is on the consignee to establish
that a deficiency in the quantity specified in the bill of lading afterwards
discovered, is chargeable to the wrongful act or neglect of the carrier.
M'Cready vs. Holmes, - - - - 229
2. To constitute a delivery by the master of goods brought in a vessel
from a port in another State to the port of Boston, under the ordinary bill
of lading, mere unlivery of the goods and landing them on the wharf is not
auffcient; there must also be reasonable notice to the consignee, allowing
him to make the usual and necessary preparations to receive the goods.
And it is no delivery to unlade the goods at an unusual time. Thus, where,
by the usage of a port, consignees are not in the habit of receiving goods
on the day of the annual fast, a notice by the master to the consignee that
he shall unload goods on that day will not bind the consignee to receive
them; and where goods were so unladen, and not accepted or received by
consignee, and were, on the same day, destroyed by fire on the wharf:
Held, that the loss must fall upon the carrier. The Salmon Falls Manu-
facturing Company vs. the Barque Tangier, - - - 504
3. Fire, occurring on the wharf, after goods are landed, is not within
the exception of damages of the seas, in the ordinary bill of lading. Ibid.
4. Nor is such a fire within the act of Congress of March 8d, 1851, re-
lieving ship owners from liability for damage by fire to goods on board of •
vessels, in certain cases. 1bid.
CASES AFFIRMED.
Hill vs. Golden Gate, - - - - 273
St. John vs. Paine, - - - - 422
Genesee Chief and Oregon vs. Rollo, -- - - 422
Dixon vs. Baldwin, -. . . 563
CASES COMMENTED ON.
Foster's Appeal, - .. . 752
Grand Gulf Bank vs. State, - - - 690
Little Miami Railroad vs. Stevens, - --4
Planter'j Bank va. Sharp, - - - 690
CASES EXPLAINED.
Erie Railroad vs. Skinner, - .. .42
Pennsylvania vs. the Wheeling Bridge, - 6
CASES QUALIFIED.
Devoe v8. Penrose Ferry Bridge Company, o 6
CANON LAW.
See Divorce.
INDEX. 773
CATTLE.
See Railroad.
1. The common law of England is the law of Mississippi only so far as it
is adlapted to her institutions, and the circumstances of her people, and is
not repealed by statute or varied by usages which by long custom have su-
perseded it. The Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad Company vs. Patton, 457
2. By the common law of England, the owner of cattle, horses, &c., is
bound to keep them within a sufficient enclosure; and if he permit them
to escape and run at large, and wander upon the premises of another,
whether enclosed or not, he is liable for the trespass, and the cattle so
trespassing may be distrained damagefeasant. But this rule of the com-
mon law is not adapted to the circumstances and condition of the people
of this State, where the population is not dense, and there are large tracts
of uncultivated and unenclosed lands fit for the pasturage of cattle: and,
moreover, the people of the State have, from its earliest settlement, per-
mitted their domestic animals to run at large in the "range," and depas-
ture on unenclosed lands, and hence the rule is not in force here. Ibid.
3. In this State, the owner of cattle, horses, &c., which are not of a
dangerous character, may lawfully permit them to range at large on unen-
closed commons; and if, in so doing, they wander upon the premises of an-
other not enclosed by a lawful fence, he is not liable for the trespass, and
they cannot be distrained damagefeasant. Ibd.
4. The owner of unenclosed land may prosecute his lawful busirnss
thereon, but in so doing he must exercise reasonable care and diligence to
avoid injuring the cattle of others, which may have wandered on the pre-
mises. Ibid.
5. A railroad company has the exclusive right to the use and possession
and enjoyment of the land upon which their track is located, and they
may run their engines and cars on the same at whatever time and with
whatever speed they see proper, not inconsistent with the safety of
the persons and property committed to their charge; but this right
over the land is no higher nor more extensive than that of its original
owner; and hence if their track be unenclosed, they must run their en-
gines and cars with reasonable care and prudence, so as to avoid injury
to cattle which may be depasturing on the track; and if they fail to do
so, they will be liable for the injury done. Ibid.
6. A railroad company is bound by law to keep the road and machinery
in good order, and to have a sufficient number of faithful and trustworthy
employees to manage and control the rununing of their engines and cars;
and if, by their failure in any of these respects, the cattle of another de-
pasturing on their unenclosed track be injured or destroyed, they will be
responsible to the owner in damages. .bid.
CHANCERY.
See Assignment, Mortgage, Railroad.
CHARACTER OF VESSEL.
See Lien.
CHARITABLE BEQUEST.
1. A bequest for the founding, establishing and upholding an animal
sanatory institution within a mile of either Westminster, Southwark, or
Dublin, for investigating, studying, and without charge beyond immediate
expenses, endeavoring to cure maladies, distempers, and injuries any
quadrupeds or birds useful to man may be found subject so-Held to be a
good charitable bequest within the meaning of the statute of Elizabeth.
The University of London vs. Yarrow. . . . . . 169
2. Semble, that had the bequest been had, as implying the purchase of
land near Westminster or Southwark, and therefore violating the Mort-
main act, the option for the trustees to establish the institution in Ireland,
where the statute of mortmain does not apply, would have prevented the
bequest from being invalid.-Per the Lord Chancellor. Did.
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CHARITABLE USE.
See Will.
CHARITY.
See Charitable Bequest.
CHARTER.
See Lien. Municipal Subscription.
A charter must be construed according to the intent of the Legislature,
if such intent can be ascertained by the language used. Coe vs. the Cleve-
land Railroad, - - - 27
CHATTEL.
See Lex Loci.
CITY OF MAYSVILLE.
See Municipal Subscriptions.
CO-E MPLOYEE.
See Railroad.
COLLA-TERALS.
See Bond.
COLLISION.. -
1. Where a steamboat and sail vessel are approaching each other, and
a collision takes place between them, if there is mutual fault, the loss that
is occasioned must be divided. Haney and Trenchard, owners of the
schooner Perrin vs. The steamer'L6uisiana and George W. Russell, her
Captain, . .. . . .. 422
2. A steamboat in the night time navigating the waters of a bay or
-river, must always have a look-out, who, for the time, has no other duty
or occupation. Ibid.
COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.
1. The carrier's contract with his passenger implies: first, that the lat-
ter shall obey the former's reasonable regulations ; second, that the car-
rier shall have his means of transportation complete and in order, and his
servants competent. Sullivan vs. The Philadelphia and Reading Rail-
road, . . .. . . 342
2. If a passenger be hurt without his own fault, this fact raises a pre-
sumption of negligence, and casts the onus on the carrier. Ibid.
3. This beinga presumption of fact, it is for the jury to determine. Jbid.
4. It is no answer to an action by a passenger against the carrier, that
the injury was caused by the negligence, or even trespass, of a third per-
son. The parties are bound by their contract. Ibid.
COMMON CARRIERS.
See Telegraph.
COMMON LAW.
See Cattle.
CONDUCTOR.
. See Railroad.
CONSIDERATION.
See Promissory Note.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Slavery.
1. By the l1th art. of the Constitution of Wisconsin, it is provided that
. "no municipal corporation shall take private property for public uses,
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against the consent of the owner, without the necessity thereof being first
established by a verdict of a jury." The charter of the city of Milwau-
kee authorized the judge of the Circuit or County Court of Milwaukee,
where land is proposed to be taken for public use, to appoint twelve jurors
to view the ground, determine the necessity of the taking, and assess the
damages therefor: but the Act did not in express terms require that the
jury should be sworn before entering upon their duties, or provide any
mode for swearing them: Held that the act was unconstitutional, and the
proceedings thereunder, void, though the jury may have been, in fact,
sworn. Lumsden vs. The City of Milwaukee, . . . . 157
2. The legislature, in 1833, chartered the Grand Gulf Railroad and
Banking Company, with power "to purchase and possess personal estate
of any kind whatever," and "to sell and dispose of the same at pleasure ;"
in 1840, the legislature enacted that, it should not be lawful for any bank
in the State to transfer by endorsement, any note, &c., and in an action on
such note, the fact of transfer might be pleaded in abatement: Held,
that the act of 1840 was constitutional, and applied to the Grand Gulf
Banking Company, inasmuch as the powei of ttansfer was neither ex-
pressly granted nor required by implication. Murdock vs. Brown, - 690
CONSTITUTION OF ILLINOIS.
See Slavery.
CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY.
See Stoppage in Transitu.
CONSTRUCTION.
When the legislative will can be ascertained from different enactments,
they should be so construed as to make that will effective, although no
express language is used which declares such legislative will. Wood vs.
Blanchard, . . . . . 434
CONTEMPT.
1. A contempt of court in the United States courts must arise from dis-
obedience of or resistance to some decree or order in existence, hence
where A, on the 17th day of September, 1852, sold a certain patent while
a suit was pending in relation to it, and on the 28th of September, 1852,
an injunction was issued : ileld, that the sale was no contempt. Per
GREEN, Master. Goodyear vs. Day, . . . . . 632
2. The history of the law of contempt in the United States courts traced
and discussed. Per Gi.EN, Master. rbid.
CONTRACT.
See Action, Bond, Bridges, Common Carrier of Passengers, Insurance,
Jurisdiction, Navigable River, Railroad.
1. Where subscriptions to stock are made, to be paid in instalments, and
certificates of stock are to be issued for the several instalments, a readi-
ness and willingness to issue the certificates at the time payment is to
be made, is all that can be required. James vs. Cincinnati, Hamilton
and Dayton Railroad Company et al, - - - 18
2. In an action to recover money agreed to be paid for the stock, an
averment of a readiness and willingness to issue and deliver the certifi-
cates of stock is necessary. The right to enforce payment is not dis-
tinct and independent from the ability to issue and deliver the stock. If
the subscriber cannot get the stock, the payment of money cannot be en-
forced. The acts to be done must be regarded as contemporaneous. fbid.
3. When a party, having the ability to perform an executory contract,
on his part, assigns his interest in such contract, he must be considered
as equitably bound to perform it, so as to give the benefit of it to the as-
signee. He cannot be permitted to say he is not ready, If, on the day
fixed for performance, he had the ability, he must be considered, so far as
the assignee is concerned, as having the willingness. Ibid.
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4. The assignment of a contract, and notice of that assignment, creates
no additional burden, nor does it impose any additional duty of active dili-
gence upon the contractor. If the subject matter of the contract be left
within the power and under the control of the assignor, the risk of its
being impaired or destroyed, so as to defeat the performance, is assumed
by the assignee. There is no principle by which it would be thrown on
the other party. Ib'd.
5. If the article which a party agrees to supply has a certain and known
character, that party has no right to change or alter its character, and still
expect it to be received in fulfilment of the contract, unless the change be
-within the contemplation of the parties. If the acts of one of the par-
ties, after the making of a contract, have so injuriously affected the sub-
ject matter of the contract, as to destroy the benefits expected from it by
the other party, this would be a defence. Ibid.
6. The mereestablishment of a particular line of road, and erection of
a bridge in a particular location in a town, by a railroad company, after a
controversy with the inhabitants with respect thereto, does not Amount to
a contract so as to preclude -the company, after a lapse of time, from
changing the direction of their line and the position of the bridge. Mil-
nor vs. New Jersey R. R. Co., . . . . 6
CONVEYANCE.
See Trnst.
CORPORATION.
See Bond. Constitutional Law. Promissory Notes. Railroad.
1. It has been said that the powers of a corporation are only such as the
law of its creation gives; but this leads to another question: what powers
does its charter, or act of creation, fairly and properly construed, give ?
It is, in each case, a question of construction. James w. Cincinnati R.
R. Co., .. . .. . . 718
2. Powers conferred upon corporations are of two descriptions: some
are generl-others special and limited. Some have reference to the
mode in which acts are to be done, and are merely directory-others are
in the nature of a limitation of power or a condition precedent. Third
persons, acting in good faith, are not usually to be affected by an excess
or violation of the former, on the part of the company; but of the latter,
they are, the act itself must be regarded as illegal, and knowledge is pre-
sumed. Ibid.
COUPONS.
See Bond.
CRIMINAL LAW.
See Insanity.
CRUEL TREATMENT.
See Divorce.
CUSTOM.
See Bill of Lading.
DAMAGES.
See Cattle, Death by Violence, Railroad.
DATE.
See Mortgage.
DEATH BY VIOLENCE.
1. An action underPenun. actof 1855, (Brightly's Diges4 p. 1138,) provid-
ing a remedy in case of death by violence, or negligence, can only be main-
tained by the persons enumerated in the act itself, viz : the husband,
the widow, the parents, the children. Coakley v8. The North Penn. Rail-
road, . .. . . . 855
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2. In estimating the damages, the injury done to the party living,
caused by the death, is the measure; and no compensation can be claimed
for the suffering of the decedent. 1bid.
8. No compensation can be allowed for the distress and anguish which
the plaintiff may be supposed to have suffered; but any expenses to which
the plaintiff may have been subjected, should be included in the verdict.
Ibid.
4. Suggestions as to the pecuniary value of life; estimable value of life,
must be determined by the jury. Ibid.
5. Exemplary damages should not be given, unless the defendant has
been guilty of fraud, oppression, gross negligence, malice, &c. Ibid
DELIVERY.
See Bill of Lading.
DELUSION.
See Insanity.
DEPOSIT.
See Bond.
DEVISE.
See Will.
DILIGENCE.
See Railroad.
DISTRIBUTION OF FUND.
See Mortgage.
DISTRIBUTION.
See Admiralty.
DIVORCE.
1. Mutual insults and outrages, the fruit of mutual provocations, unless
there be a palpable disproportion of guilt as between the parties, furnish no
sufficient ground for divorce. Trowbridge vs. Carlin, her husband; Car-
ln vs. Henrietta Trowbridge, his wife, . . . . . 740
2. Disappointment in the marriage relation, and incompatibility of tem-
per, are not causes for decreeing a judicial separation between husband
and wife; but outrages and cruel treatment of a nature to render conjugal
life intolerable, provided the complaining party is comparatively inno-
cent, are sufficient to obtain a decree. Ibid.
3. The texts of the civil law on this subject cited, and commented on.
Ibid.
4. The doctrine of the Canon law adopted in Louisiana. Ibid.
DOMICILE.
1. Although an actual change of domicile, by consent of the master,
from a slave to a free State, has the effect to manumit a slave, yet a mere
sojourn in Ohio, or transit through the State, by a slave domiciled in Ken-
tucky, does not have such effect. Poindexter vs. Anderson, - - 78
2. Although involuntary servitude can not be required, in Ohio, of a
negro slave from Kentucky sojourning in this State, yet where a negro
slave domiciled in Kentucky, after having been in Ohio on an errand, or
in itinere, has voluntarily returned to his state of servitude in Kentucky,
his status as a slave continues by the laws of that State, and must be
recognized by the courts of Ohio, when brought under consideration in
connection with a contract made in Kentucky. Ibid.
EMPLOYEE.
See Railroad.
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ENDORSEMENT.
See Promissory Note.
EQUITABLE TRANSFER.
I See Askignment.
EQUITY.
See Assignment. Franchise. Injunction. Lien. Mortgage. WilL'
EXECUTION.
See Partnership.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
See Death by Violence.
FAULT.
See Railroad.
FENCE LAW
See Railroad.
FIRM DEBTS.
See Partnership.
FIRE.
See Bill of Lading.
FORECLOSURE.
See Mortgage.
FOREIGN LAW.
Where a foreign law is in dispute, whether there be such a law is a
matter of fact for averment and proof. When it is shown in evidence. its
construction and effect is for the court. James vs. Cincinnati Railroad, 718
FRANCHISE.
See Jurisdiction.
1. If acts and agreements give to a corporation a franchise or exclt'.
sive privilege of taking-toll, and erecting a bridge, that franchise or privi-
lege may be taken by the legislature of- the State, under its right of
eminent domain, on providing compensation. bilnor vs. New Jersey
Railroad Company, .6
2. Such franchise or exclusive privilege, if it exists, is vested in the cor-
poration at large and not in the individual members, and may be waived
or relinquished by the action of a majority of the corporators. Rbid.
3. It is settled at common law, that a franchise is not subject to levy
on execution; it can only be reached in Chancery. Ludlow vs. Hurd, 493
FREE PASSENGER.
See N/egligence.
FUND.
See Admiralty Lien.
GLANDERS.
- See Action.
HALLUCINATION.
See Insanity.
HIGHWAY.
See Negligence. Railroad.
HORSE.
See Action.
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INJUNCTION.
1. An injunction may be granted by a court of blended equity and common
law powers, to restrain proceedings of an equitable nature in another
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction and similar powers, in a litigation sub-
stantially first commenced and still pending in the former, and this though
the pleadings in the first suit were not at the time of the institution of the
second, sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the relief therein sought, if
such relief could by appropriate proceedings be adequately obtained in the
court first obtaining possession of the litigation. Conover vs. The Mayor, 131
2. A court of equity will not interfere to restrain legal proceedings, where
the complainant has an adequate remedy at law. Erie Canal Company vs.
Loury, - 750
3. D., an actor, contracted with W., the manager of a theatre, to play at
W.'s theatre for twelve consecutive nights, commencing on a certain day,
stipulating that he should be at liberty during those nights to perform
(among other characters) three which were named; but there was no ex-
press condition that D. should not act elsewhere during the twelve nights.
On the approach of the day appointed for commencing the engagement, D.
declared that he would only act in apiece which could not be produced at
W.'s theatre; and when told that was impossible, declared that he would
not act at all for W., and advertised himself to act at another theatre on
the night appointed for the commencement of his engagement.
4. Held, that an injunction might be granted to prevent D. acting dur-
ing the twelve nights at any other theatre during the ordinary hours at
which W.'s theatre was open for Dublic performance. Webster vs. Dillon, 174
INJURY.
See Railroad.
INSANITY.
1. The test, in insanity, is the power or capacity of a prisoner to distin-
guish between right and wrong in reference to the particular act in ques-
tion. Commonwealth vs. Freeth, . .. . . 400
2. If theprisonerlabors under partial insanity, hallucination or delusion,
but nevertheless did understand the nature of his act, and knew that it
was criminal, and had sufficient mental power to apply that knowledge to
his own case, and if he had sufficient memory to recollect his relations to
and with others, and that the act committed was against justice and right,
and a violation of the dictates of duty, he is responsible. Per LuDLow,
J.-Ibid.
INSPECTIONS OF CARS.
See Railroad.
INSURANCE.
See Abandonment of Voyage.
1. Where an insurance company incorporated by the State of New
York, having their principal office in New York, and there executing poli-
cies of insurance which were transmitted to agents in Baltimore who had
authority to receive applications for policies and to receive and transmit
notes for the premiums, and through whom the company paid losses to
parties in Baltimore, it was held that the contract of insurance was a New
York and not a Maryland contract. Wright vs. the Sun Mutual Insurance
Company of New York; Same vs. the Orient Mutual Insurance Company
of Now York, - .. . . . . 485
2. Where the policy contained this clause, "to add an additional pre-
mium if by vessels rating lower than A2," and the cargo was shipped in a
schooner rating lower than A2, and no fixed sum as additional premium
agreed upon, held that the assured, in case of loss, could recover the value
agreed in the policy, less such additional premium beyond the agreed per
cent. as in the opinion of the underwriters might be deemed adequate for
the increased risk of a cargo shipped in a vessel rating below A2.-Ibid.
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JUDICIAL SALE.
See Lien.
JURISDICTION.
See Admiralty Lien.
A court of the United States has no jurisdiction to restrain by injunc-
tion the erection of a bridge over a navigable river lying wholly within the
limits of a particular State, where such erection is authorized by the legis-
lature of the State, though a port of entry has been created by Congress
above the bridge. Milnor vs. the New Jersey Railroad Company ; Shard-
low vs. the Same; Bigelow vs. the Same; Milnor vs. Newark Plank Road
-Company et. aL. Shardlow vs. the Same, 6
LEGISLATURE.
See Construction.
LEX LOa.
See Assignment. Domicile. Insurance.
1. A sale of horses vas made in the State of Virginia, within the jilrisdic-
tion of which both the parties and the property Were at the time, but pos-
session was retained by the vendor. The horses were subsequently sent
into the State of Pennsylvania to be pastured, and there made the subject
of an attachment by creditors of the vendor. It was held that the validity
of the sale, and df the title of the vendee, was to be determined by the
law of Virginia, so far as it differs from that of Pennsylvania on the sub:-
ject of fraud in the sale of chattels. Born vs Shaw, - - 286
2. The lez loci contractus must govern both as to the status of th par-
ties,' and the subject matter of the contract. Poindexter Vs. Anderson, - 78
LIEN (REAL ESTATE.)
1. A was the owner of three properties, numbered respectively 295, 297,
299, upon which there were apportioned liens in favor of B, who was a
.creditor of Aae by being a holder of thirteen notes, for which the liens
were held as security, twelve of the notes being unpaid; there was a she-
riff's sale of No. 299, the proceeds of which were paid exclusively to cre-
ditors other than B; Nos. 295, 297, were then sold at sheriff's sale: held,
that B might claim his whole debt from the fund arising from the sale of
the latter, the security and not the debt being apportioned. Appeal by
the Bank of Pittsburg in the Matter of the distribution of the Fund arising
from the Sale of Store and Lot of Robert Davis, . . . . 310
2. A mortgage given on the entire property of a railroad, including
future receipts for transportation, with an agreement that property bn the
road subsequently acquired, shall be bound, and a conveyance of it be
-duly executed, gives an equitable lien on property subsequently acquired,
to the bondholders of bonds secured by the mortgage. Coe, Trustee vs.
,Pennock and the Cleveland Railroad, .. . . 27
. A person who constructs cars, or other rolling stock, for a railroad,
if he deliver the stock to the company, without any special provision to
receive the payment, can claim no lien on the work. He may effect this
lien while the work is in his possession. And if he obtain a judgment
against the company for the work, an execution cannot be levied on the
rolling stock on which a former lien exists. Ibid.
4. Where there are liens on the property of a railroad company, the
liens must be adjusted in chancery, where each claimant shall receive his
proportionate share of the proceeds. The appointment of a receiver is
generally ruinous, and a sale of such property should not be made, under
a reasonable prospect of payment, by a faithful application of the profits
,f the road. Ibid.
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LIEN IN ADMIRALTY.
1. By the maritime law there is no lien for supplies in the home port.
The credit is supposed to be given to the owner, and not the ship. Marsh
& Son vs. The Brig Minnie. Commins vs. Same. Bee & Tylee vs. Same.
Myzer vs. Same, . . .. . . 328
2. J. C. owned the brig M. and sold to T., who secured the purchase
money by a mortgage duly executed and recorded. Subsequently to the
sale and execution of the mortgage, J. M. & Son repaired the brig and
kept her in their custody until the marshal attached her; B. & T. fur-
nished ship chandlery, but were at no time in possession; H. S. did the
joiner work, but was at no time in possession: Held, that these liens
must be marshaled, as follows-First, J. M. & Son, the shipwrights,
must be paid, because they had a strict maritime lien, and had posses-
sion, and no act of the owner can defeat a lien which the law creates;
second, the mortgagee, and third, the balance rateably to the other libel-
ants. bid.
3. The mortgage act of 1850 considered and interpreted. Bid.
4. Where the vessel is in her home port, and the material men are not
in possession, and no local law recognizes their claims as privileged, they
must be postponed to the mortgage creditor who has an interest in
rem. Ibid.
5. It is settled that there can be no lien bytbe general maritime law for
materials or supplies furnished a ship in the home port. Hill vs. The
Golden Gate-Johnson vs. The Ambassador, . . . . 273
6. A judicial sale, in a proceeding in rem, will discharge maritime liens,
whether general or statutory, in whatever jurisdiction it may be de-
creed. Ibid.
7. The operation of the Boat Acts, on the Western rivers, considered.
The cases cited and commented on. Afid.
8. The foreign or domestic character of a vessel must be determined by
the residence of her owners. Ibid.
9. If a vessel is navigated by charterers, who have exclusive control of
her, they are to be deemed the owners pro hac vice. Ibid.
10. A general maritime lien cannot be divested by the legislature of a
State. Ibid.
11. An admiralty sale alone can judicially pass a title to a vessel, dis-
charged of liens. Ibid.
LIS PENDENS.
See Injunction,
LOCAL LAW.
See Lien.
LOOKOUT.
See Collision.
MACHINERY, DEFECTS IN.
See Railroad.
MANDAMUS.
See Municipal SubsQriptioi
MARRIAGE.
See Divorce.
MARSHALING FUNDS.
See Lien.
MARSHAL.
See Admiralty.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.
See Railroad.
MATERIAL MEN.
See Lien.
MAYSVILLE.
See Municipal Subscription.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
See Mortgage.
MILWAUKEE.
See Constitutianal Law.
MISJOINDER.
In an action on a contract made between two married women after
coverture, the husbands alone must sue and be sued: the use of the wife's
name is a misjoinder. Williams and Wife vs. Coward and Wife, - - 315
MORTGAGE.
See Admiralty. Lien.
1. Under the Ohio statute regulating railroads, a chartered railroad cor-
poration is fully authorized to execute a mortgage as security for money
borrowed upon bond. Ludlow vs. Hurd, - - - 493
2. Where the mortgage described the property as "the right of way
and land occupied thereby, together with, &c.," enumerating every kind
of property attached to and used by a railroad, and added "and other
property then owned by or thereafter to be acquired and owned by the
said company," it was held, that in equity, furniture contained in the
company's business office, if necessary for the operation of the road, was
within the language of the mortgage, and that an execution levied on it
must be postponed to the lien of the mortgagee. Ibid.
3. Where a power of attorney is given by three tenants in common of
village lots, for the sale, leasing, and absolute disposal of all or any part
of their interest in said lots, and the attorney conveys the share of one of
the principals, and takes a conveyance back, and then mortgages the same
interest for money loaned, all at the same time, the mortgage is, in equity,
the mortgage of the principal. The Cleveland Insurance Company vs.
Reed and his Wife, Rogers, and the Milwaukee and Mississippi Railroad
Company, - 406
4. A purchaser under decrees of foreclosure of prior mortgages cannot
take advantage of the want of power of the attorney; but he can inquire
into the true consideration of the mortgage. IBid.
5. It seems, that where land is sold under an executory contract, liens
against the equitable estate of the vendee will be postponed to a purchase
money mortgage executed on the subsequent conveyance of the legal
estate, though that mortgage be not recorded -within sixty days: and
though it be made to a third Person, and not to the vendor; provided it
be given as a part of the same transaction, and, in fact, to secure the
purchase money. Campbell's Appeal; Siner's Appeal, - - - 757
6. The vendee of a lot of ground under a parol contract, entered into
possession before payment of the purchase money, and erected a build-
ing. Afterwards, by an arrangement between the vendor and the owner
of the equitable estate, a conveyance was made to the latter, who, at the
same time and as part of t/e same transaction, executed a mortgage of
the premises to a third person, to secure the purchase money; which was
advanced by him to the vendor. The mortgagee had no notice, actual or
constructive, of the previous existence of the equitable estate; and the
building was then completed, but not occupied. The mortgage was not
recorded within sixty days after its apparent date, though it was so on
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the day of its actual delivery. The premises being afterwards sold under
the mortgage, it was held that the mortgagee was entitled, on distribu-
tion of the proceeds of sale, to priority over mechanic's liens for work and
materials employed in the erection of the building, (hough it was alleged
that the holders of these liens had abstained from bidding at the sale, so
as to protect themselves, under the belief that the date of the mortgage
was its true date, and.that it had, therefore, lost its lien. Ibid.
7. Whether in such case, if the mortgage be given to secure a larger
amount than the purchase money, the mortgagee, even though ignorant
of this fact, could claim priority over the mechanic's liens for more than
the actual amount of the purchase money, quare. Ibid.
MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS.
See Slavery.
MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTION.
1. The 'Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company was chartered on
the 4th of 'March, 1850; by the terms of the charter, the city of Mays-
ville was authorized to subscribe stock, and to become a stockholder to
the amount of $150,000; and the charter further provided, that it should
be lawful for the city to raise the amount of subscription by a tax on the
real and personal estate of the said city, or by borrowing the amount,
and made the sum so borrowed or raised by tax, payable in the way and
on the terms deemed most advisable by the mayor, &c.; and also made
provision for the payment of the interest on the amounts borrowed. It
further provided, that all taxes laid to pay either the principal or interest,
should be pledged and appropriated to that purpose, and to no other. By
virtue of this law an election was held, and the vote resulted unanimously
in favor of the subscription of $160,000 by the city, and it was accord-
ingly made, and the city became the chief stockholder of the said railroad,
and started and controlled its organization, and the election of its officers.
By reason of this subscription, and by the efforts of the citizens of Mays-
vile, the counties of Mason, Benton, and Fayette, voted for and took large
subscriptions of stock, as well as the individual citizens residing in those
counties. On the 17th of February, 1851, the legislature amended the
company's charter, and authorized the cities and counties that should sub-
scribe under the original act, to execute bonds payable to the president
and directors of the company, and authorized and required the county
courts and city councils to levy and collect an amount in money, upon the
real and personal property of said cities and counties, sufficient, annually,
to pay off the interest on said bonds, and pointed out the mode of levy
and collection. The city council of Maysville, under this amendment,
ordered one hundred and fifty bonds, for $1,000 each, to be executed by
the president of the city council, under the seal of the city, and issued
them to the railroad company, who accepted them in consideration of
twenty shares of the capital stock of the company for each bond. The
plaintiffs became, in good faith, holders of these bonds, and the interest
upon them was regularly paid until July, 1857; held, that notwithstand-
ing there might have been some technical or formal non-compliance with
the provisions of acts, there was a substantial compliance, and that it was
the duty of the authorities of Maysville to make provision for the regular
payment of the interest on these bonds, and the ultimate redemption of
principal. Graham vs. The City of Maysville and Alexander 'Mad-
dox, - 689
2. The facts, that the calculations made by the advocates of the road
had proved delusive and erroneous, that the road cost more than was anti-
cipated, and had failed before its completion, are no evidence of fraud,
and cannot avail against an innocent bondholder for value. Ibid.
3. The true interpretation of the charter under which this subscription
'was made, is that the city council of Maysville was to appoint the time
and give notice of the vote, and make the subscription; and this has been
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done. The duty of the mayor was ministerial;- the power of the rote
controlled him, and after the vote, the mayor and the council must sub-
scribe. Ibd.
4. That the bonds are made payable to the Maysvile and Lexington
railroad instead of to the president and directors of the said company, is
an objection of mere form, and without substance. I-bid.
5. Where the company's charter provided that the interest should be
due yearly, it is no violation of it that the interest is made payable semi-
annually instead of annually. Rid.
6. Every objection which would have sustained an injunction before the
negotiation of these bonds, cannot avail, after their negotiation, against a
bona fide holder or innocent purchaser for value. Ibid.
7. Where the legislature made it the duty of the city council to levy
and collect a tax for a specified purpose, such direction is mandatory, and
it becomes the duty of the city to levy such tax, which duty may be
enforced by mandamus. Ibid.
MUTUAL FAULT.
See Collision. Negligence.
NAVIGABLE RIVER.
See Bridge. Franchise. Jurisdiction.
NAVIGATION.
See Collision.
The rules of navigation as'settled in St. Johir vs. Paine, 10 How. 583;
The Genesse Chief, 12 How. 461, and The Oregon vs. Roceo, re-affirmed
and acted upon. Haney vs. The Louisiana, - 422
NEGLIGENCE.
See Bill of Lading. Cattle; Common Carrier-of Passengers.
1. If the plaintiff's injury is attributable in any degree to his own negli-
gence, he cannot recover. O'Brien vs. The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and
Baltimore R. R. Co. - - - - 361
2. Negligence is the want of that car which men of common sense and
common prudence ordinarily exercise in their employments. Ibid.
3. One who is about to cross a. railroad at grade, on which locomotives
run, is bound to stop and listen, and look in both directions, before he
allows his team. to set foot within the rails, and an omission to do so is
negligence on his part. Ibid.
4. Where the plaintiff was a free passenger on a railroad, train, under a
special contract with-the carrier that the latter should not be-liable-to any
damages arising from negligence, and.- was injured, by a- collision,.it was
held, that the-contract was valid, and that. the.plaintiff could not.recover
unless he could show that thanegligence was fraudulent, wilful or reckless
Wells vs. The New York Central Railroad Company, - - - 713
5. Signification of the word "negligence" in this contrat Ibid.
6. Though there. be negligence or fault on the part of the plaintiff,
remotely connected with the injury, yet if the defendants' fault or negli-
gence was the immediate and proximate cause of theinjury, the plaintiff
may maintain his action for. damages. Vicksburg R, R. vs. Patton, 457
7. It is competent for a plaintiff, on the trial of an action against a rail
road- company for damages:done by them to his property by the- negligent
and careless running of their engine. and cars, to introduce evidence to
show that the general. character of the engineer in charge of the train
when the injury was- done, was that of a. reckless and untrustworthy..
agent. Ibid.
8. The jury may allow exemplary damages against a-railroad company,
if it appear that. the property was destroyed or injured by the gross negli.
gence or wilful and wanton mischief of its agents. Did.
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9. In action for negligence it is the duty of the judge charging the jury
to define the legal signification of negligence, and then to refer the ques-
tion of fact to the jury to say where and to whom the negligence attaches.
Reeves vs. The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, 565
10. It is the general rule in the American courts, that where both par-
ties are in fault., or guilty of the negligence which causes the loss, neither
can recover against the other. Ibid.
NEGOTIABILITY.
See Bridge. Jurisdiction. Promissory Note.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
See Promissory note,
NOTE.
See Bill of Lading. Promissory Note,
NOTICE.
See Assignment. Mortgage.
OFFICE.
See Construction.
The law making power may continue or create an office, without an
express declaration that such office shall be continued or created, if the
intention to do so is manifested by requiring official acts to be performed
by such officer, or if provision is made for filling vacancies in such office.
Wood vs. Blanchard, - - - 434
ONUS PROBANDL
See Common Carrier of Passengers. Ordinary SkilL Negligence. Railroad.
PARTNERSHIP.
An execution issued against A, a member of a firm, was levied upon
his interest in the firm property: then a second, issued against B, the other
partner, was levied on his interest: afterwards a third against A and
B, as partners, -was levied on the firm property: It was held that the
Sheriff ought to have sold on the writ against the firm the interest of all
the partners, and to have paid the firm debts in preference to those of the
individual creditors. Rex, Silvas and Co. vs. Lommon and Machlin, 745
PAYMENT.
See Promissory Note.
PECUNIARY VALUE OF LIFE.
See Death by violence.
PERSONAL ESTATE.
See Murdock vs. Brown, - - - 690
PERSONALTY.
See Real Estate.
PILOTAGE.
The steamship George Law coming into the port of New York, was spoken
by a licensed pilot, who offered his services as such legally licensed pilot,
which were refused; he then demanded a certain sum, claiming to be enti-
tled to it under the pilotage laws enacted by State statute, and libelled the
ship: held, that he had no lien, and that the ship was not liable. Leitch
vs. The Steamer George Law, - - 368
POLICY.
See Insurance.
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POWER OF ATTORNEY.
See Mortgage.
POWER.
See Attorney.
POSSESSION.
See Lien.
PREMIU1I.
See Insurance.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See Mortgage. Railroad.
1. Where an agent, who has reesived instructions from his principal to
effect a policy of insurance, employs a third person for that purpose, who
gets the policy effected through his own broker, but shows to him at the
time the instructions which the principal had given, the broker has no right
to retain the money he may receive under the policy, upon a loss occuring.
against a debt due to him from such third person ; and such retention being
therefore unlawful, will not give the principal any right of action against
his agent to recover the whole amount received by the broker under the
policy. Cahill vs. Dawson. - . . . . . 176
2. Quore, whether an agent employed by his principal to effect a policy
of insurance is liable for a breach of his duty as agent if he employ another
person to get the policy effected by a policy broker? Ibid.
3. It is a clear and general principle that the principal is liable for the
negligence of his agent. Coakley vs. The North Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, .. . . 355
PRIORITY.
See Mortgage.
PROMISSORY NOTE.
1. Where negotiable paper has been put in circulation by fraud, proof
of the circumstances may be given; when it is incumbent on the holder to
show that he is a bona fide holder and for a valuable consideration:
Cummings vs. Mead, - . .51
2. If a negotiable note is accepted in satisfaction of a previous debt, the
person so receiving it is a holder for value, and is protected. But not so
-when a note is handed over to a creditor, with directions to collect it and
to retain the surplus; and afterwards the debt was settled. It then reverted
to the former holder. Ibid.
3. Unless a note is taken in good faith for valuable consideration, the
holder is considered as being in privity with the endorsee. A merchant
having purchased a note at an extraordinary rate of discount, after he
learned that-the payees, as merchants, hadfailed, and that the money was
wanted to pay preferred debts, is not a bona fide holder against the pre-
vious lien of a judgement creditor-particularly if the parties to the
negotiation are relatives. He should have inquired into the circumstances
of the holders. Ibid.
4. It is no defence to a suit by a holder against the maker of a promis-
sory note, that the plaintiff is not the owner of the note and gave no value
for it, and that when he took it he knew that it was an accommodation
note, and that defendant had received no value for it. Holmes vs. Paul, 482
5. There is no difference between business paper and accommodation
paper negotiated. .1bid. - -
6. A promissory note procured by an incorporated company for its
accommodation under the terms that the company would provide for its
payment at maturity, may lawfully be purchased or discounted by one who
is a director of the company and a member of its finance committee, though
he knew of these terms when he took the note. Ibid.
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7. Such a person (unless he was the agent of the company for the sale
of the note,) takes a good title to it; and another person who is not the
owner of the note, but who received it without value from the owner, viz:
from the director, &c., may maintain an action on it against the maker.
ibid.
8. Payment of a promissory note by the maker before maturity does not
extinguish it as against a bona fide holder, without notice. Runyan vs.
Reed, - . . . . - - 305
9. When a note has been paid by the maker before maturity, his endorse-
ment would be notice of that fact to the holder. Ibid.
10. But such endorsement is not itself evidence of payment It is, when
standing unexplained, evidence that the endorsements prior to the name of
the maker were for his accommodation. Ibid.
11. Where an instrument was drawn without containing in its body the
usual words of negotiability, but on the face of the note was the phrase
"payable and negotiable at the Kensington Bank," it is not a negotiable
note unless it is discounted at the bank where made payable. Raymond
vs. Middleton & Co. - - - - 377
12. The contract of endorsement considered. Ibid.
PROPERTY.
See Slavery.
PURCHASE MONEY.
See Mortgage.
RAILROAD CROSSING.
See Negligence.
RAILROAD.
See Assignment. Cattle. Common Carrier. Contract of Passengers.
Death by Violence. Franchise. Lien. Mortgage. Negligence.
1. When an employee enters into the service of a railroad company, he
assumes the risks incident to such employment, such as the carelessness
or unskillfulness of his co-employees, when they were skillfal and careful at
the time of their employment. Hawley vs. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company, -. . . .. 351
2. In the selection of servants the company is bound, in such case, only
to the extent of care which prudent men ordinarily exercise. Ibid.
3. When a company is responsible for neglect or carelessness of co-
employee. Ibid.
4. When the organization of a railroad company takes place, which
organization is usually formed by the instrumentality of commissioners
appointed for that purpose, the authority of the commissioners ceases;
and in the absence of any special provisions to the contrary, all powers as
to any further subscriptions to the capital stock vest in the corporate body.
Its dealing with third persons, as to its stock, must stand upon the footing
of ordinary contracts. James vs. Cincinnati Railroad, - - - 718
5. The plaintiff mistook a door at a railway station, and, passing
through it instead of another, fell down a flight of steps and was hurt.
There was a light over the door which he intended to pass through, and a
printed notice showing the purpose of it. There was also an inscription
over the other, but no light. The defendant could not read. There was
no evidence that the steps were more than ordinarily dangerous. Held,
that the railway company were not liable. Tooney vs. The London,
Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, - - - 316
6. At the intersection of a railway and turnpike, the traveller by the
highway has a right to be within the rails long enough to cross them, but
he is bound to look out for trains, and must not rush heedlessly nor remain
unnecessarily on a spot where the law allows engines to be propelled.
Reese vs. The Delaware Railroad, - -- - 565
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7. A railway company, in the prosecution of its lawful business, is enti-
tled to the same protection, and subject to the same responsibilities, as a
natural person. The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company vs.
Jones, . . .. . .346
8. The want of skill and caution, in the exercise of its privileges, is the
true ground upon which to base any right to recover damages for an injury
done to another by a railway company while engaged in its lawful business.
.bid.
9. The fact that cattle are killed by collision with a railway train, at a
point where the railway track crosses a country road, does not render the
company responsible in damages, for it has a right to cross the highway,
observing proper care and caution to avoid accident. Ibid.
10. And the owner of the cattle cannot recover in such case, without
proving want of skill and caution -on the part-of the company. Ibid.
11, The case is much less favorable to the owner, where cattle are
killed, straying on the track of the company, remote from the point of in-
tersection. Ibid.
12. The fence law of Virginia does not make it lawful for the cattle of
persons in the neighborhood to be upon the track of a railway, unenclosed
by a lawful fence, but merely deprives the company of any remedy
against the owners of cattle for any damages which may result to the
company from their straying on such unenclosed track. Ibid.
13. In an action against a railway company for damages for killing
cattle, the onus is on plaintiff to prove negligence and misconduct on the
part of the company. Ibid.
14. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show killing by the company.
but it is incumbent on him to show some act of misconduct on the part of
the company, to make out aprimafacie case of injury. Ibid.
15. In an action against a railroad company, for an injury sustained by
a person while acting in the capacity of conductor on a train of cars, on
the ground that the injury was the result of the insufficiency of the cars,
or defects in the machinery of the train, the company is not to be treated
as a guarantor of the suliciency and safety of the cars and machinery of the
train; but as responsible only where the injury is without fault on the part
of the conductor, and the result of the neglect of ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence in furnishing sufficient and safe cars and inachinery for
the train. The Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company vs. Anson C.
B a r b e r , . .. .. 5 3 4
16. The conductor of a train of railway cars, although he undertake his
engagement in view of the nature, hazards and responsibilities of his em-
ployment, has reason to expect, and a right to exact, that reasonable care
and diligence on the part of his employer, in furnishing him with safe and
sufficient cars and machinery for the train, which is most common and
usual in the business of railroad companies; and being presumed to con-
tract in contemplation of this, he can require no more. Ibid.
17. The conductor of a train of railway cars, being the representative
of the railroad company in the command and management of the
train, and not being under the immediate control and direction of a supe-
rior or supervisory agent., is held to ordinarg and reasonable care and dili-
gence, not only in the management of the train, but also .in the due
inspection of the cars, machinery and apparatus of the train, as to their
sufficiency and safety; and if he receive aA injury while neglecting that
care and diligence required of him in the management of his train, or by
means of any defect or insufficiency in the oars, machinery or apparatus,
with a knowledge of which he was running the train, or which could have
been known to him, by the exercise of that care and diligence required of
him in the performance of his duty, or in other words, if his neglect in
either of these particulars contributed as a proximate cause of the injury,
he can have no right of action against the company for damages. Ibid.
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18. A railroad company is not liable to an action for damages for an
injury received by a conductor of one of its trains, in consequence of the
insufficiency of the cars, or defects in the machinery or apparatus of the
train under his charge and control, where such insufficiency or defects
were unknown to both parties, and neither party was in fault. Ibid.
19. In such action, the plaintiff, in order to lay a sufficient foundation
for a recovery and judgment, for an injury received by him while acting as
such conductor, must aver, or show in his petition, in addition to the alle-
gation that he had not a knowledge of the insufficiency or defects which
were the alleged cause of the injury, that he had exercised due care and
diligence in the use and examination or inspection of the cars, machinery,
etc., belonging to the train, while the same were in his charge, and under
his direction. Ibid.
20. It is the duty of a railway company to furnish the necessary and
proper number of hands for the safe management of its trains, and also to
exercise due care and diligence in furnishing sufficient and safe machinery;
and for a delinquency in either particular, the conductor of a train has a
right to decline his charge, or refuse to run the train. But where he
takes the charge, and runs his train for a length of time, without a suffi-
cient number of hands, he voluntarily assumes the risk, and waives the
obligation of the company in this respect as to himself, and if injured by
means of such delinquency on the part of the company, he is without a
remedy against the company for damages. bid.
REAL ESTATE.
The fragments of a building blown down by a tempest, are not thereby
converted into personalty, but pass to the purchaser of the realty at
sheriff's sale. Rogers vs. Gillinger, 43D- - -
REASONABLE CARE.
See Railroad,
RECEIVER.
See Lien.
RECORDING.
See Mortgage.
ROAD CROSSING.
See Railroad.
ROAD.
See Cattle. Contract.
SALE OF COLLATERALS.
See Bond.
SALE.
See Action. Lex Loci.
SALVAGE.
1. Where a steam tug is kept constantly employed during the winter,
on a dangerous station, and at a heavy expense, for the express purpose
of rendering salvage and towage service to vessels in distress, her owners
are entitled to the full remuneration usually awarded to salvors who perti
life and property, though the particular salvage service may not have been
actually accompanied by much danger or labor. Virden vs. The Brig
Caroline, - -. . . . . . . . 222
2. A brig was caught and damaged in the ice in Delaware bay, and,
from the nature of her injuries, could only be rescued by the removal of
her forward cargo. This was done (and it was not otherwise possible) by
and with the assistance of a steam tug stationed at the Breakwater. Part
of the cargo thus removed was transhipped to the tug, and the brig after-
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wards towed by her into port. The court decreed to the owners of the
tug one-half of the value of the cargo transhipped, and four per cent. of
that of the vessel and remaining cargo. Ibid.
SATISFACTION.
See Promissory Note.
SEALED INSTRUMENT.
See Action.
SEPARATE PROPERTY.
See Partnership.
SERVANT.
See Railroad.
SEVERANCE.
See Real Estate.
SHERIFF.
See Admiralty.
SHERIFF SALE.
See Real Estate.
SHIP'S MORTGAGE.
See Lien.
SLAVERY.
1. The constitution of Illinois prohibits slavery; therefore, negroes
within its jurisdiction are supposed to be free. Rodney vs. The Illinois
Central Railroad, - . .. . . 439
2. The State of Illinois being an independent sovereignty, will deter-.
mine foritself the condition of all persons within its territory; subject to
the constitution of the United States, and the laws made under authority
of thatinstrument. Ibid.
3. Slavery is the creation of municipal regulations in States where it
exists, and such regulations have no extra territorial operation or binding
force in another sovereignty. Ibid.
4. The laws of other States recognizing slavery, being repugnant to the
laws and policy of the institutions of Illinois, neither the law of nations
nor the comity of States can affect the condition of a fugitive in Illinois,
so as to give tho owner any property in, or control over him, by force of
any State authority. ibid.
5. The remedy in matters connected with fugitive slaves, is to be found
under acts of Congress, and in the courts of the United States. Ibid.
6. Property in persons being repugnant to the constitution and lws of
Illinois, trover cannot be maintained for the recovery of a person, or for
satisfaction for the loss. Ibid.
SLAVE.
See Domicile.
SOJOURN.
See Domicile.
STATUTE OF ELIZABETH.
See Charitable Bequest.
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STATUTE OP LIMITATIONS.
See Mortgage.
1. The statute limiting suits in chancery lo ten years, should be applied
to a suit to forclose a mortgage against a purchaser under prior mort-
gages, brought seventeen years after the mortgage debt was payable, the
mortgage given, and the mortgage debt payable before the statute took
effect-particularly when the mortgagee had notice within two years after
the sale under the prior mortgages, and that the purchaser was in posses-
sion of the premises claiming title. Cleveland Ins. Co. vs. Reed, - - 406
2. Without such a statute, equity would not disturb the possession or
title of such a purchaser, as the demand is stale; and there must be con-
science, good faith, and reasonable diligence to call into aefion the powers
of a court of equity.
3. Quere.-Whether by analogy to the statutes of the State limiting the
time for the redemption of lands sold for debt, a subsequent mortgagee,
not a party to a bill of a prior mortgagee to foreclose, should maintain a
bill in equity to redeem after two years, against a purchaser under a de-
cree on the prior mortgage?
STATUS.
See Domicile.
STEAMBOAT.
See Collision.
STOCK.
See Railroad.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
1. As long as the goods are on their way to the vendee, and while in
the hands of the middle man, the vendor's lien remains, and he may
enforce it by stoppage in transitu. Cabeen vs. Campbell, - - - 561
2. Constructive delivery discussed. Ibid.
STORM.
See Real Estate.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
See Injunction.
SUPPLIES.
See Admiralty. Lien.
TELEGRAPH.
1. Where a telegraphic communication was sent subject to the express
condition that the telegraph company would not be liable for mistakes
arising from any cause unless the message was repeated by being sent
back, it was held, that the plaintiff was bound by his contract, and could
not recover unless he brought himself within the terms of the company's
undertaking. Camp vs. the Western Union Telegraph Company, 443;
affirmed, . . . . . .. 734
2. Telegraphic companies are not, in any just sense, common carriers,
and cannot be made liable upon the principles applied to carriers. Ibid.
TEMPEST.
See Real Estate.
TITLE.
See Lex Loci.
TOWAGE.
See Salvage.
792 INDEX.
TRANSIT.
See Domicile.
TRAVELER.
See Negligence.
TRUST, CHARITABLE BEQUEST, WILL.
1. A trust in favor of the grantor cannot be inferred in a conveyance
absolute upon its face, from proof that he continued to retain possession
of the property, and that no money was paid by the grantee. Ballbeck
vs. Donaldson, - - - 148
2. Whether an express agreement, resting in parol, that the grantee
should hold the title in trust for the grantor, can be enforced, quxtre 9 Ibid.
TUG.
See SalVage.
UNENCLOSED LAND.
See Cattle.
USURY.
See Mortgage.
Usury must be specially pleaded, or specifically set forth on the record,
and supported by evidence, or the court will not inquire into it. Cleve-
land Insurance Company vs. Reed, - - - 406
VESSEL.
See Admiralty.
WILL.
Testator, domiciled at Philadelphia, devised certain lands in Pennsyl-
vania to twelve trustees. "in trustfor the formation and supportof a home
for aged, infirm or invalid gentlemen and merchants, where they may en-
joy the comforts of an asylum-not eleemosynary, but as far as may be by
the addition of their own means, and by reference to the Prytaneum of
Ancient Athens, au honorable home-with the hope that it may be per-
petuated and enlarged by the bequests of its grateful inmates, until it
shall become worthy of the city of Penn, and a blessing to a class whose
wants have hitherto been overlooked ; leaving to my trustees full power
to conduct and carry out. this institution on the best possible plan, and to
provide for its permanent usefulness in or near my native city." On bill
filed and claim made by the residuary devisees under the will, and by the
heirs at law of the testator, to have the devise declared invalid, inopera-
tive and void-IHeld,
That the devise was good under the laws of Pennsylvania, and wasvalid
as a charitable use.
Whether independent of the charitable character of the devise it could
be sustained as a trust, qumere? Cresson vs. Cresson, - - 42
WISCONSIN, CONSTITUTION OF.-
See Constitutional Law.
